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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
Case No.
15413

-vsCHRIS DEAN BENDER,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a criminal proceeding in which the
appellant, Chris Dean Bender, was charged with the crime
of theft in the third degree in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§

76-6-403 (1953) , as amended.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Appellant was tried by a jury on March 3, 1977,

before the Honorable James
theft in the third degree.

s.

Sawaya, and found guilty of

Appellant was sentenced to

an indeterminate term as provided by law and placed on
probation.

As terms of that probation, the appellant is

required to reside at the Community Correction Center
(Halfway House) until released by that facility.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks affirmation of the conviction
and judgment rendered below.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Francis Hayes, an employee of Chalk Garden, a
woman's clothing store located in Salt Lake City, testified
that on December 21, 1976, she had just arrived at work
when she first noticed the appellant in one of the Chalk
Garden's dressing rooms (T.3).
saw the appellant

11

At that time, Ms. Hayes

kind of bent over, •

something in a big paper bag.

11

(

T. 5) •

putting

The article being_.

put into the bag was identified as being a leather coat
belonging to the Chalk Garden (T.24-25).

The sack into

which the coat was put by the appellant was not one of
the vanity used by the Chalk Garden, but was one used by
ZCMI Department Stores (T.21).
After contacting John Bernard, owner and manager
of the Chalk Garden, concerning what she had seen the
appellant do, Ms. Hayes returned to the dressing room in
which the appellant had concealed the leather coat in the
ZCMI bag, and found a hanger (T. 7) •

The hanger was wooden,

and was of the type used by the Chalk Garden for the more
expensive merchandise (T. 7).

Ms. Hayes testified that the

employees usually tried to keep all hangers cleared out of
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the dressing rooms so as to know exactly which articles
go in the dressing rooms and which came back out (T.7).
Further testimony by Ms. Hayes revealed that
the appellant, upon leaving the dressing room and with
the coat in the ZCMI sack, stopped and looked at some
pants on a rack, as he was approaching the front of the
store (T.7,14).
John Bernard, upon being contacted by Ms. Hayes,
followed the appellant from the dressing room, past the
check out area (cash register), to the front of the
store.

He saw the appellant stop at the cash register

area, engage in a brief conversation with someone (T.20),
then proceed towards the front door (T.20).

It was at

this point that Mr. Bernard stopped the appellant, asking
him if he (appellant) would show what was contained in the
sack (T.20).

Bernard then took the sack and looked into

it, seeing the coat which belonged to Chalk Garden (T.21).
The appellant told Mr. Bernard that he had purchased the
coat at ZCMI (T.21).

He repeated this statement several

times (T.22), but later changed his story, saying that he
wanted or intended to purchase the garment (coat) from
Chalk Garden (T.23).
On cross-examination, Mr. Bernard testified that
he did not stop appellant immediately after he came out
of the dressing room, because he wanted to give appellant
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

a chance to pay for the merchandise at the cash register
counter {T.38-39).

The same reason was given for not

stopping or approaching the appellant at the cash register
counter {T.39).

Bernard also testified that after the

appellant passed the check out counter, appellant was in
the process of walking directly out of the store, and
did not stop to browse or look at any of the merchandise
located in the front of the store near the entrance-exit
(T.48).
The appellant took the stand in his own behalf,
and testified that he had been resting on a bench in the
Chalk Garden when he noticed a woman leave the ZCMI bag in
the dressing room {T. 53-54) •

His testimony was that he wen:

over to the dressing room, closed the sack, picked it up,
and proceeded to the counter {T.55).

He related that he

told a sales lady at the checkout counter that he thought
a woman had left the bag with the coat in it {T.55).

No

response came from the sales lady, according to appellant
(T.55).

It was at this time, testified Bender, that Mr.

Bernard came up to him and grabbed the bag (T.55).
On cross-examination, it was brought out that
the appellant did not attempt to alert the lady he supposed!
saw leave the dressing room to the fact that she had forgot'.
her bag with the coat inside {T.59).

It was also pointed

out that once the appellant took possession of the bag, he
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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was in no hurry to either notify the lady that she had
left her bag (assuming arguendo that there was in fact
such a woman), or to proceed to the checkout counter for
purposes of notifying a sales lady of the situation
(T.59-60).
Having been apprehended by John Bernard, appellant
was subsequently turned over to security police in Trolley
Square.

They in turn delivered him to Officer Sheya of

the Salt Lake City Police Department (T.28-29).
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO GIVE
APPELLANT'S PROFFERED JURY INSTRUCTION ON THE LESSER
INCLUDED OFFENSE OF ATTEMPTED THEFT.
Subsequent to reading of the Insturctions to the
jury by the court and closing arguments by the respective
attorneys, appellant took exception to the court's denial
of his request to have an attempted theft instruction given
(T.66,67).

(It should be noted that both counsel, upon

suggestion by the court, stipulated that exceptions to the
court's instructions be taken after the jury had retired
to deliberate [T.66].)
The appellant's requested instruction read as
follows:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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"In the event that you have a
reasonable doubt as to Mr. Bender's
guilt as to the crime of theft, you
may then consider whether or not Mr.
Bender is guilty of attempted theft.
Before you would be warranted in
convicting Mr. Bender of attempted
theft, the State must prove each and
every one of the following essential
elements of that crime:
1. That on or about December 21,
1976, the said CHRIS DEAN BENDER did
attempt to obtain or exercise unauthorized
control over the property of the Chalk
Garden.
2. That he at tempted to obtain the
property with the purpose to deprive the
said Chalk Garden of said property.
3. That said property had a value
in excess of $250.00 but less than
than $1, 000. 00 lawful money of the United-States.
4. That such acts occurred in Salt
Lake County, State of Utah.
Mr. Bender's plea of not guilty
thereby casts upon the State the burden
of proving beyond a reasonable doubt each
and all of the foregoing essential elements. Thus, before you can convict Mr.
Bender of the crime of attempted theft,
you must find from the evidence, beyond
a reasonable doubt, each and every one
of the foregoing elements.
If you find
that the evidence has failed to prove
any one or more of these essential
elements to your satisfaction beyond
a reasonable doubt, then it is your duty
to acquit Mr. Bender."
(R. 30).
Appellant contends that it was prejudicial error
for the court to omit instructing the jury on the lesser
included offense of attempted theft.

A

review of existing

statutory and case law leads to the conclusion that the
.

lower court's ruling refusing the lesser include

d . structi

in

was proper.
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•

Utah Code Ann. § 77-33-6 (1953), as amended,
which appellant cites as imposing on the court an
obligation to give an instruction on the lesser included
offense, reads:
"The jury may find the defendant
guilty of any offense the commission of
which is necessarily included in that
with which he is charged in the indictment or information, or of. an attempt
to commit the offense."
As the appellant correctly states in his brief, the Utah
Supreme Court has recently interpreted, in State v. Pierre,
Supreme Court No. 13903, November 25, 1977, the above
section to be subject to the modification of Utah Code
Ann. § 76-1-402(4)

(1953), as amended, which states:

"The court shall not be
obligated to charge the jury with
respect to an included offense unless
there is a rational basis for a
verdict acquitting the defendant of
the offense charged and convicting him
of the excluded offense."
Utah Code Ann. § 77-33-6 (1953), as amended, read
in conjunction with Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(4)

(1953), as

amended, as required by State v. Pierre, supra, clearly does
not impose any obligation on the court to give a lesser
included instruction on an attempt.
A review of Utah case law, even before the enactment of Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(4)

(1953), as amended,

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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and the recent decision in Pierre, discloses that the lbi
the giving of lesser included offense and attempt instruct:
has not really changed, and the enactment of Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-1-402 (4)

(1953), as amended, really codified the exist

case law at the time of its enactment.
As early as 1889, this Court in People v.
6 Utah 101, 21 Pac. 403

Robi~

(1889), held that it is not always

necessary that the court instruct the jury as to all lesser
offenses, even though they may be embraced within the char1:
set forth in the indictment, and of which the defendant mi1
be convicted.
In 19 2 3, the foundation for the present state of
law of lesser included instructions was laid in State v.
Angle, et al., 61 Utah 432, 215 Pac. 531, 532 {1923).
the defendant was convicted of grand larceny.

Ther

On appeal, h

argued that the trial court erred in refusing to grant a ju
instruction on petit larceny.

In affirming the lower court

decision, the Utah Supreme Court said:
" • • • It is argued that because
larceny is divided into two degrees,
grand larceny, a felony, and petit.
larceny, a misdemeanor, the court in
its charge should have covered th~
offenses included in the information.
It is a well-settled rule that
instructions as to lower grades of
the offense charged should be given
when warranted by the evidence.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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It is equally well settled that
in a criminal prosecution error
cannot be predicated on the
omission of the trial court to
instruct as to lesser grades of
the offense charged where there
is no evidence to reduce the
offense to a lesser grade." 21S
Pac. at S321, S32.
(Emphasis
added.)
This principle of law set forth in Angle was reaffirmed later
in State v. Ferguson, 74 Utah 263, 279 Pac. SS, S6 (1929), and
State v. Dodge, 19 Utah 2d 44, 42S P.2d 781, 782 (1967).
In State v. Mitchell, 3 Utah 2d 70, 278 P.2d 618, 621
(19SS), the Supreme Court of Utah, in affirming a conviction
of second degree murder, again cited State v. Angle, supra,
and declared:
" • • • Nor is it always the
duty of the court to instruct on the
lesser offenses,--for example, where
either a conviction or outright acquittal
of a particular offense is mandatory,
leaving no room to hold an accused for
any other offense. Nor must the court
always instruct as to lesser offenses
whether requested so to do or not • • • • "
Turning to more modern day decisions, i t is evident
that this Honorable Court has not seen fit to alter the
principle of law set forth in Angle.
In State v. Ash, 23 Utah 2d 14, 4S6 P.2d 154 (1969),
the defendant was convicted of grand larceny of an automobile.
The evidence disclosed that he had left the motel where he
was lodging, driving another person's car.

He was subsequently

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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chased down by a deputy sheriff.

In the car defendant

was driving was found shaving equipment, underwear, a gun
and some gun shells.

On appeal, the defendant alleged errc

in that the trial court failed to instruct as to the lesser
offense of driving a vehicle without the owner's consent
and with intent to temporarily deprive the owner of
possession.

The Utah Supreme Court rejected this contentic

by appellant:
•••
the defendant could not
have been prejudiced by a failure
to have the jury consider whether
his intent was to deprive the owner
of the use of his car temporarily
because the court clearly told the
jury to find the defendant not guilty
if they failed to find beyond a
reasonable doubt that he intended
to deprive the owner permanently of
the use of the car. 11 456 P. 2d at 155.
11

Subsequent to State v. Ash, supra, this Court hel
in State v. McCarthy, 25 Utah 2d 425, 483 P. 2d 890, 891
(1971):
11
•••
when parties so request,
they are entitled to instructions on
their theory of the case, including
the submission of lesser included
offenses. However, this is true only
where there is some reasonable basis
in the evidence to justify the givin~.
of such instructions. • • • 11
(Emphasis
added.)

Later in 1971, in State v. Harris, 26 Utah 2d
489 P. 2d 1008

(1971), a robbery-rape-kidnapping case, it

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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361

Wi

held that where, under any reasonable view of evidence, the
defendant was either guilty of the greater offense or not
guilty, instructions as to lesser included offenses would
have only confused issues, and thus it was not reversible
error for the court to refuse to instruct on lesser included
offenses.

Speaking at 489 P.2d 1001, the Court said, quoting

from State v. Gillian, 23 Utah 2d 372, 463 P.2d 811, 814
(1970):
"' • • • where the question raised
relates to the refusal to submit
included offenses, it is our duty to
survey the whole evidence and the
inferences naturally to be deduced
therefrom to see whether there is any
reasonable basis therein which would
support a conviction of the lesser
offenses.'"
In the concluding paragraph in Harris, the Court said:
"In the instant case, under any
reasonable view of the evidence, the
defendant must be found either guilty
of the greater offense or not guilty.
Under such circumstances, instructions
as to lesser offenses would only confuse."
489 P.2d at 1011.
It can thus be said in summary of the heretofore
cited cases that, even without considering Utah Code Ann.
§

76-1-402 (4)

(1953), as amended, State v. Pierre, supra,

and State v. Dougherty, 550 P.2d 175 (Utah 1976)

(to be

discussed hereinafter), all of which lend credence to the
above cases, the law in Utah has tended toward exclusion of
lesser included offense instruction if the following
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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situations exist:

( 1) there is no reasonable bas is for the

instructions, i.e., there is no reasonable basis on which
to reduce the greater offense {State v. Harris, supra;

~

v. McCarthy, supra; State v. Angle, supra; State v. Gillian,
supra);

(2) the evidence warrants either a guilty or not

guilty verdict on the greater offense {State v. Mitchell,
supra; State v. Harris, supra) 1 (3) the giving of lesser
included instructions would tend to confuse the jury
(State v. Harris, supra).
Perhaps one of the most recent enlightening cases
on the subject of lesser included instructions is Statev.
Dougherty, supra.

There, the defendant was convicted of th1

crime of unlawful distribution for value of a controlled
substance.

He appealed, alleging that the trial court em

in refusing to give an instruction on the lesser included
offense of possession of a controlled substance.

In

affirming the conviction, this Honorable Court held that
where defense testimony could prove only complete innocence,
the defendant was not entitled to an instruction on the
lesser included offense.
Testimony in Dougherty revealed that an undercove!
agent, Woolsey, had negotiated with a Ms. Keller over the

-12Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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telephone regarding the purchase of some marijuana.

That

night, Woolsey went to Ms. Keller's apartment, paid $90
to her and received the marijuana.

They both left the

apartment together, and subsequently encountered the
defendant in front of Ms. Keller's apartment.

Prior to

this encounter, Woolsey had returned the marijuana to
Ms. Keller.

Upon seeing the defendant, Ms. Keller gave

the money and marijuana to the defendant, who in turn
gave the bag to Woolsey.

No negotiations were made with

the defendant regarding the purchase. Ms. Keller's
testimony denied most of the testimony of Woolsey_._
In referring to Utah Code Ann. § 77-33-6 (1953),
as amended, the Court said at 550 P.2d 176:
"This statute, we have said, requires
instructions on lesser included offenses,
when the evidence and circumstances justify.
When an appellant makes an issue of a
refusal to instruct on included offenses,
we will survey the evidence, and the
inferences which admit of rational
deduction, to determine if there exists
reasonable basis upon which a conviction
of the lesser offense could rest. No
such basis exists here."
In referring to the contradictory testimony of
Woolsey and Ms. Keller, the Court further said at 550
P.2d 177:
"The defense testimony could only
prove complete innocence. Appellant's
reason for his exception to the court's

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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refusal to give the instruction is
the jury by selectively evaluating
the facts as is their province, could
well have determined the defendant
was in possession of the marijuana
in question at a time sufficient to
render him guilty of possession only.
Such a theory is not available to him
where the record shows he could only
be found guilty or not guilty of the
crime charged."
In its opinion, the Court very clearly

enunciate~

the three situations in which the problem of lesser include
offenses are frequently encountered:
" • • • First, where there is
evidence which would absolve the
defendant from guilt of a greater
offense, or degree, but would support
a finding of guilt of a lesser offense,
or degree: the instruction is mandatory.
Second, where the evidence would
not support a finding of guilt in the
commission of the lesser offense or
degree. For example, the defendant
denies any complicity in the crime
charged, and thus lays no foundation
for any intermediate verdict, or where
the elements of the offense differ,
and some element essential to the
lesser offense is either not proved
or shown not to exist.
This second
situation renders an instruction on a
lesser included offense erroneous,
because it is not pertinent.
Third, is an intermediate situation. One where the elements of
the greater offense include all the

-14Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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elements of the lesser offense;
because, by its very nature, the
greater offense could not have
been committed without defendant
having the intent in doing the
acts, which constitute the lesser
offense.
In such a situation
instructions on the lesser
included offense may be given
because all elements of the lesser
offense have been proved. However,
such an instruction may properly
be refused if the prosecution has
met its burden of proof of the
greater offense, and there is
no evidence tending to reduce the
greater offense." 550 P.2d at
176, 177. (Emphasis added.)
Subsequent to Dougherty, the Utah Supreme Court
in State v. Bell, 563 P.2d 186 (Utah 1977), affirmed the
principles set forth in Dougherty, declaring the state of
the law as it presently exists:

-15-
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" . . The trial court should give
the instructions for lesser included ·
offenses whenever, by any reasonable
view of the evidence, the defendant
would be guilty of the lesser included
offense. The instructions for included
offenses may be properly refused if the
prosecution has met its burden of proof
on the greater offense and there is no
evidence tending to reduce the greater
offense." 563 P.2d at 188.
The Court added a very significant comment at 563 P. 2d 188:
"Whenever this court believes
beyond a reasonable doubt that the error
in not giving the instruction would not
have affected the verdict the case
should not be reversed . • • "
The question to be decided by this Court is

~~~

or not, according to §76-1-402 (4), Utah Code Ann .. (1953.)_(i:.
amended) , there was a rational basis for a verdict acquittir.
the defendant of the offense of theft and convicting him of
attempted theft.
In order to arrive at such a decision, Utah Code!
§76-6-404

(1953)

(as amended), the section under which appe!

was convicted (in conj unction with· Utah Code Ann. §76-6-403
(1953)

(as amended)), must be analyzed in light of the evid 0•

addressed at the trial.
Utah Code Ann. §76-6-404

(1953)

(as amended) read;

"A person commits theft if he obtains
or exercises unauthorized control over the
property of another with a purpose to deprive him thereof."

-16Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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The evidence in the case at bar indicates that the
appellant was in control and possession of property belonging
to the Chalk Garden (T.24,25); that he did not have permission
or authorization from the Chalk Garden to be in possession of
the property in question (T.29); the value of the property in
question was over $250.00 but less than $1,000.00 (T.26); and
that the obtaining or exercising of control over the property
belonging to the Chalk Garden was for the purpose of permanently
depriving them (Chalk Garden) thereof (this intent can be
deducted by the jury from several of the actions of the defendant,
to-wit: stuffing the coat in the shopping bag different from
ones used by the Chalk Garden (T.5); changing "stories" concerning the explanation of why appellant was in possession of
the coat (T.22,23); taking the coat past the check-out counter
without attempting to pay for it and being apprehended shortly
before reaching the exit (T.19-20) ). Appellant admits in his
brief all of the factual items above except for the testimony
regarding the statements allegedly made to Mr. Bernard, owner
of the Chalk

Garden, regarding the explanation as to why appellant

had a coat belonging to Chalk Garden concealed in a ZCMI bag.
Thus, the only item in dispute is the element concerning the
intent to permanently deprive the Chalk Garden of possession
of the item in question.
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The issue of intent being the only one in con ten.
tion, it can be seen from appellant's own testimony

that h'

presented an "all or nothing" issue to the J'ury on th e issu
of intent.

He alleges that he saw a lady leave the sack w:

the coat in it in a Chalk Garden dressing room (T.54), &
subsequently took possession of the sack and attempted to
depart from Chalk Garden, allegedly in an effort to run~K
the woman who had left the sack (T.63).

If this was in fac

the case and the jury was inclined to so believe this versi
of the story, then no conviction could stand either for the
greater offense of theft or for the lesser offense of aUE
theft, since there would be no criminal intent, which-o1"1r.
must be present for a conviction in either case.

On the of

hand, if the jury believed, as they apparently did, the
evidence presented .by the prosecution, the requisite intent
to permanently deprive can be found and the conviction for
the greater offense of theft would stand.

Therefore, s~~

there is no factual dispute as to whether or not the appell
had possession of the coat in question, without proper auth:
tion, and since no dispute exists as to the value thereof

0

the coat, the only issue to be decided was the one of inter:
Due to appellant's ownI testimony and version of the sequenc,
of events, the jury is placed in a position of either decia
that there was an intent to permanently deprive, or there
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1

an honest effort to return a sack with a coat in it that
belonged to another lady, in which case there could be no
criminal intent.

It should be noted that the same reasoning

applies to the issue of authorization.

If the jury believed

that the coat was indeed left by a woman in the dressing room
and that the appellant was indeed performing his role of the
"Good Samaritan" by seeking to return it, no unauthorized
control could be present, thus another essential element of
of the crime of theft and attempted theft (attempted unauthorized
control) would be lacking.
As heretofor reasoned, the jury was placed in a
position of either convicting the appellant of theft or
acquitting him.

The evidence presented no other choice.

As

such, the case falls directly under the guidelines of State v.
Dougherty, where the Court declared, "The defense testimony
could only prove complete innocence."

There, as here, the

appellant tried to proceed on a lesser included offense theory,
but this was rejected by the Court:
" . • • Such a theory is not available
to him where the record shows he could
only be found guilty or not guilty of the
crime charged." 550 P.2d at 177.
It can be said, therefore, that under Utah Code Ann.
§

76-1-402 (4)

(1953)

(as amended), the trial court in the case

at bar was not obliged to instruct as to an included offense,
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because even though the jury may have chosen to belie~~
appellant, thereby acquitting him, no evidentiary basis
existed upon which a conviction of an attempted theft couJc
stand.

Since Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402 (4) is stated in th,

conjunctive, both statutory requisites must be present befc
the trial would be required to instruct·on the included
offense of attempt.
Finally, these comments should be made in refern
to appellant's allegations.

First, the allegation in hist:

that he never left the Chalk Garden, therefore no asportati!
causing the case at bar to fall within the purview of the f:
situation discussed by the Court in Dougherty, is total-l.Jiwithout merit.

The necessary asportation was

fulfill~~r

appellant concealed the coat in the ZC.MI bag and began waH·
ing towards the exit.

As will be discussed in Point III in

this brief, the asportation question presented in Statev.
Doherty, 29 Utah 2d 320, 509 P.2d 351 (1973), is very simila:
in fact to the case at bar, and was sufficient in law ~fu
the requirements of being one of the necessary elements of
larceny.

As will be later discussed, this Court has heWc

more than one occasion that the removal of an object from

e

place where the property is found is sufficient asportatio~
to support a larceny charge.
284 P.2d 691

State v. Richards, 3 Utah Zd

(1955); State v. Doherty, supra.
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Second, appellant's allegation that his case falls
within the third situation referred to by the Court in
Dougherty is without merit.

Under such a situation, proffered

lesser instructions may properly be refused by the court if
the prosecution has met its burden of proof on the greater
offense.

Without being repetitious, the evidence heretofor

cited and presented to the jury was more than enough to enable
the prosecution to fulfill its burden.
Third, and perhaps most important of all, appellant's
proffered instruction on attempted theft was not warranted by
the evidence, and thus could not as a matter of law be given.
Appellant's instruction alleges that he did "attempt to obtain
or exercise unauthorized control over the property" and
"attempted to obtain the property with the purpose to deprive.
of said property."
is

~-mrded

The instruction as proposed by appellant

in a fashion which would lead one to beli·eve that

the appellant did take steps leading towards the goal of
exercising control over the said property, but was stopped short
of accomplishing such a goal.

Since the facts, as admitted by

appellant himself, establish that he did in fact have control
over the property in question, and since appellant, by his own
testimony, claims that this control was authorized (implied
authorization since he alleges he was attempting to return
something to the rightful owner), then his proffered instruction

-21-
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is self-contradictory, and as a matter of law incapable
of being given.

It is questionable also, whether or not

such an instruction as proposed by appellant would meet
other qualifications set forth in the attempt statute, ~~
Code Ann. §76-4-101,

(1953)

(as amended).

For the reasons heretofore cited, it is the conclusion of respondent that the trial court did not err in
refusing to instruct on attempted theft.
POINT I I
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO INSTRC:
THE JURY ON REASONABLE ALTERNATIVE HYPOTHESIS.
At the trial, appellant submitted a jury

ins~

on reasonable alternative hypothesis, which reads as follo11
"To warrant you in .convicting the
defendant of the crime charged in the
complaint, the evidence must, to your
minds, exclude every reasonable hypothesis
other than the guilt of the defendant;
that is to say, if after a full and fair
consideration and comparison of all the
testimony in the case you can reasonably
explain the facts in evidence on any
other reasonable ground other than the
guilt of Mr. Bender, then you must
acquit him." (R.31)
The court refused to give the instruction, and rightly so.
The law in Utah as to the giving of a jury instrui
on reasonable alternative hypothesis was stated in Stat~
Fort, Supreme Court No. 15197, Dec. 22, 1977, and
Garcia, 11 Utah 2d 67, 355 P.2d 57,59,60 (1960):
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in~

. . where the only proof of
material fact or one which is a necessary
element of defendant's guilt consists of
circumstantial evidence, such circumstances
must reasonably preclude every reasonable
hypothesis of defendant's innocence . • •
. . . this rule is applicable only
where the proof of a material issue is
based solely on circumstantial evidence.
(Emphasis added~)

"

The principle was cited and reaffirmed in State v.
Schad, 24 Utah 2d 255, 470 P.2d 246, 247 (1970); State v. Romero,
554 P.2d 216
(Utah 1976).

(Utah 1976); and State v. Dumas, 554 P.2d 1313
In Romero, the Court reaffirmed that even if only

a portion of the evidence is circumstantial, a reasonable
hypothesis instruction is not required:
"When the only proof of presumed
facts consists of circumstantial evidence,
the circumstances must reasonably preclude
every reasonabl~ hypothesis of defendant's
innocence, but this is not controlling
when only part of the evidence is circumstantial.
" 554 P. 2d at 219. (Emphasis
added, l
In Schad, supra, the Court, in referring to the rule
of law concerning reasonable hypothesis instructions where the
conviction is to be based upon circumstantial evidence, declared
that such a proposition did not and does not apply to each
circumstance separately:
" . • . where a conviction is based
on circumstantial evidence, the evidence
should be looked upon with caution, and. : •
it must exclude every reasonable hypothesis
except the guilt of defendant • • •
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Nevertheless, that proposition does
not ~pply to each.ci:cumstance separately,
but is a matter within the prerogative of
the jury to determine from all of the facts
and circumstances shown;.
" 470 P.2d
at 247.
This Court in Schad also stated the rule

by whit

it is bound when receiving such a case as the on e present!)
before it:
"
.Unless upon our review of the
evidence, and the reasonable inferences
fairly to be deduced therefrom, it appears
that there is no reasonable basis therein
for such a conclusion.
(referring
to the fact that the evidence must exclude
every reasonable hypothesis except guilt
of defendant)
.we should not overturn the verdict." 470 P.2d at 247.
Applying the law cited hereto for to the facts of:
case at hand, it can be seen that appellant's request fma
reasonable hypothesis instruction was properly denied.
there was no circumstantial evidence.

Fir!

All of the testimony

the prosecution's case was based totally on the eyewitness
accounts of Ms. Hayes and Mr. Bernard.

Second, the case bo:

down simply to a question of whether or not the jury belieVi
the prosecution's version or the appellant's.

As such, it•

the exclusive prerogative of the jury to decide which versii
or portion thereof, to believe.

State v. Wilson, 565 P.~t

(Utah 1977); State v. Mills, 530 P. 2d 1272 (Utah 1975) ·
.. 2d 481

In State v. Hopkins, 11 Utah 2d 363, 359 P.
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(1961), a similar situation to the one presented before this
court existed in that the defendant's version was totally
different from that of the prosecution's, especially as to
the issue of intent. There, the Court refused to give a reasonable hypothesis instruction, saying that the jury must decide
which version of the evidence to believe:
"The difficulty with defendant's
position is that the rule he relies on
is not applicable. where, as here, there
is dispute in the evidence and one
version thereof does not support his
thesis.
He errs in assuming that the
jury was obliged to believe his story
as to what happened . • • " 359 P.2d at
487.
Appellant, in the case at bar, alleges that the State
presented no evidence which overtly reflected on his intent,
and as such, the evidence is subject to alternative conclusion,
one resulting in a finding of innocence and the other in guilt.
As the Court said in Hopkins, supra, at 359 P.2d 487:
"It is to be remembered that
intent, being a state of mind, is
rarely susceptible of direct proof.
But it can be inferred from conduct
and attendant circumstances in the
light of human behavior and
experience . • . "
In the present case, testimony was given by Mr. Bernard, owner
of the store, that the appellant, when apprehended with the
Chalk Garden coat concealed in the ZCMI bag, said that he
(appellant) had purchased the coat at ZCMI (T.21).

Bernard said

that appellant shortly after that changed his story, saying
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that he intended to purchase the garment from Chalk Garden
(T.23).

The appellant denied ever making such statements

(T. 64).

It was the jury's function to decide which witnes;

to believe.

Certainly the above statements, along wi~lli

fact that Ms. Hayes testified to seeing the appellant stuff
the coat into a ZCMI bag in the dressing room (T. 5), give
the jury more than sufficient room with which to find an ir,
to permanently deprive.
Coupled with the hereto for cited testimony is the
testimony that the appellant did not attempt to pay for the
coat at the cash register, nor did he have any explanation,
much less a reasonable one, to the questions

propound~J!:

as to why he did not immediately attempt to notify the supr.
lady, who left her bag, that she had in fact done so.

Appe:

did not seem to be in a hurry to chase down the forgetful
woman even after he had apprehended the bag with the coat i:
The jury thus had testimony from two eyewitnesses
from which it could easily find evidence of felonious inten:
It could also have rejected such testimony and accept~UE
pres.ented by the appellant.

Apparently, the choice was madi

to believe the testimony of the State's witnesses, finfil~
therefore that the appellant's actions were done with felon:
intent.

·
As such, the Jury
was merely exerc;s;ng its functii
i

i

in such a case where felonious intent was an issue.
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~

Richards, supra, at 284 P.2d 692; State v. Peterson, 110
Utah 413, 174 P.2d 843, 845 (1946).
Due to the fact that the evidence presented was
not totally circumstantial, either collectively or on any
single issue, and because two different versions of the
evidence were presented to jury, neither version being based
on circumstantial evidence, the Court was therefore not
required to instruct the jury on reasonable alternative
hypothesis.
POINT III
THE EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE CONVICTION
OF THEFT.
Appellant alleges that the evidence was insufficient
to sustain a conviction.

The standard for determining sufficiency

was enumerated in State v. Romero, supra, at 554 P.2d 219:
"This court has set the standard
for determining sufficiency of evidence
to require that it be so inconclusive or
so inherently improbable that reasonable
minds could not reasonably believe defendant
had committed a crime. Unless there is
a clear showing of lack of evidence, the
jury verdict will be upheld."
The Court had earlier in its Romero opinion declared that its
function was not to judge the weight of the evidence or
credibility of the witnesses:
"This court has long upheld the
standard that on an appeal from conviction the court cannot weigh the
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evidence nor say what guarantee is
necessary to establish a fact beyond
a reasonable doubt so long as the
evidence given is substantial. Further,
this court has maintained that its
function is not to determine guilt
or innocence, the weight to give conflicting evidence, the credibility of
witnesses, or the weight to be given
defendant's testimony." 554 P.2d at 218
In reviewing this case, this Court must survey

ar.

review the evidence in the light most favorable to the juri
verdict, State v. Helm,

563 P. 2d 794, 796 (Utah 1977);

~

v. Sinclair, 15 Utah 2d 162, 389 P.2d 465 (1964), and dis·
regard any errors which do not substantially prejudice the
rights of the appellant, State v. Sinclair, supra; Utah Coe
Ann. § 77-42-1 (1953)

(as amended).

Under Utah Code Anir.-'

§ 77-42-1, a presumption exists to the effect that any em

found is presumed not to have resulted in prejudice.
Perhaps one of the most accurate and concise

SUl!l

tions as to the function of an appellate court in reviewinj
jury verdict is to be found in State v. McCarthy, supra, 4i
P.2d at 892.

There, the court quoted from Jacob v. Citt.2!.

York, 315 U.S. 752, 62 S.Ct. 854, 86 L.Ed 1166 (1942), wher
Justice Murphy said:
"'· . . The right of jury trial . . ·
is . . . a right so fundamental and saared
to the citizens . . . [that it] should be
jealously guarded by the courts.' Nevertheless, once t~is right has been honored
and its purpose accomplished, the resulting verdict and judgment should be
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accorded such dignity and respect
as to give it some solidarity. This
requires that it not be upset unless
there is error of sufficient substance
that it may have had some material
effect upon the proceeding so that
there is a reasonable likelihood
that an injustice resulted."
In review of the evidence, there is no question as
to the fact that the evidence presented was sufficient to meet
the requirements of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1953)

(as

amended) .
First, appellant himself admits that he had possession
of the coat belonging to the Chalk Garden (T.54).

Second, the

testimony presented by the owner of the Chalk Garden established
that the appellant did not have permission to be in possession
of the coat (T.29).

Third, the value and ownership of the

property was established by the owner, John Bernard (ownership,
T.24,25; value, T.26).

Fourth, the intent to permanently deprive

the Chalk Garden of the ownership or control of the coat was
established by the actions and statements of the appellant (see
Point II for specific discussion).

Lastly, the asportation

necessary was fulfilled when the appellant concealed (as much
as possible) the coat in the bag and proceeded towards the exit,
after having stopped momentarily at the check stand to speak to
someone.
The facts in the case at bar are very similar to
those in State v. Doherty, supra, where the court held that
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there was a sufficient showing of asportation when the
defendant took a gun out of his pocket and dropped it on
a counter, even though the gun was not carried past the
check stand or from the premises.

The gun had previously

been removed from a gun case in the store, but there was n(
evidence that the defendant had himself removed the gun fa
the case.

The Court in Doherty reaffirmed the holding in

State v. Richards, supra, that the removal of an object frc·
the place where it is found is sufficient to constitute
asportation.
In the present case, the appellant was seen puttt
the coat into the ZCMI bag; was seen carrying it towards4!<
exit, without having paid for it.

Certainly this evidence1

even stronger claims of asportation then even in Doherty.
The present case does not lack any evidence on
to convict the appellant of theft.
were given to the jury (R. 24).

wt,

The elements of the crw

It was the responsibilityc:

the jury to determine whether the elements of the crime wer
proven beyond a reasonable doubt, State v. Coffey,
(Utah 19 7 7) .

564 PJ

Apparently the jury found the State's evidenc:

vincing beyond a reasonable doubt.
and fair trial.

The appellant had a ful

The proceedings are presumed to be va l'1d'
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state v. Valdez, 19 Utah 2d 426, 432 P.2d 53, 55 (1967), and
are in fact so found to be based upon the evidence and law
applicable thereto.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons heretofore cited, the conviction
should be affirmed by this Honorable Court.
Respectfully submitted,
ROBERT B. HANSEN
Attorney General
EARL F. DORIUS
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent

-------------
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